

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A


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*America's
Role in a
Changing
World*

*An Interview
with
Peter Tarnoff*



AMERICA'S ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD

In a speech at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government at the beginning of this year, Secretary of State Warren Christopher set out the guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton administration.

"The end of the Cold War," the Secretary said, "has given us an unprecedented opportunity to shape a more secure world of open societies and open markets — a world in which American interests and ideals can thrive. But we also face serious threats from which no border can shield us — terrorism, proliferation, crime and damage to the environment.

"If we lead, we can sustain the momentum that defeated communism, freed us from the danger of nuclear war and unfurled freedom's flag around the world."

To shape the more secure world now possible, he reaffirmed the four principles he had outlined at the same forum a year earlier:

"Our commitment to provide leadership is the first of the central principles guiding our foreign policy.

"A second principle is the need to strengthen the institutions that provide an enduring basis for global peace and prosperity. These institutions, such as the United Nations, NATO and the World Bank, help us to share the burdens and costs of leadership. This year, a top priority will be working with Congress to meet our financial obligations to the U.N. as it undertakes an essential program of reform.

"A third principle is that support for democracy and human rights reflects our ideals and reinforces our interests. Our dedication to universal values is a vital source of America's authority and credibility. We simply cannot lead without it. Our interests are most secure in a world where accountable government strengthens stability and where the rule of law protects both political rights and free market economies.

"A fourth principle is the critical importance of constructive relations with the great powers. These nations — our allies in Europe and Japan, as well as Russia and China — have the greatest ability to affect our security and prosperity."

To those continuing principles, Christopher added three new objectives for 1996, including one to deal with the new threats he had cited.

"In the coming year," he said, "we will give special emphasis to three main objectives: first, pursuing peace in regions of vital interest to the United States; second, confronting the new transnational security threats; and third, promoting open markets and prosperity."

In this first issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda a group of administration foreign policy leaders explains how the principles and objectives are being implemented around the globe; two expert observers describe the context, international and domestic, in which the policy is operating; and an international affairs expert assesses how well it is working. We hope you will find the issue interesting and informative.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A G E N D A

An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Information Agency

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
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USIA's electronic journals, published and transmitted worldwide at two-week intervals, examine major issues facing the United States and the international community. The journals — Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, and U.S. Society and Values — provide analysis, commentary, and background information in their thematic areas. French and Spanish language versions appear one week after the English. The opinions expressed in the journals do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government. Articles may be reproduced and translated unless copyright restrictions are cited on the articles.

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FORGING A FOREIGN POLICY THAT REFLECTS AMERICAN VALUES

An interview with Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

American economic and military security remains a U.S. foreign policy priority, says Tarnoff, but working for the expansion of democracy and free markets is a priority, too, because this promotes “the values that we attach importance to in our own society.” Combating the “new threats” of terrorism, drugs, nuclear proliferation and environmental degradation is also “key to our foreign policy agenda,” he says.

This interview was conducted by USIA staff writer Dian McDonald.

QUESTION: U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era is no longer focused on the overriding goal of containing Soviet Communism but is confronting a wide array of political, economic and security concerns. What are the major concerns now?

TARNOFF: It is certainly true that we have had to substantially reorient American foreign policy given the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

I think that it was clear to us early in the Clinton administration that new priorities and new objectives had to be set.

The President made clear at the outset that the defense of America’s economic security was of paramount concern to him, and this obviously applies internationally, where many of our markets exist and where trade is expanding.

Secondly, he made sure that, at the outset, our defense department looked very carefully at the requirements for a post-Cold War force with which the United States would be supremely confident of being able to not only defend itself but to undertake missions around the world. That was also done.

Third was the precept that open societies and open markets around the world are in the interest of the United States. And that is why we have done so much in places like Russia and Bosnia and others in our own hemisphere — Haiti, for example — to work with the international community to try to bring about an

expansion of democracy and free markets, not only because representative governments are less likely to fight each other and more likely to trade with each other but also because such governments embody the values that we attach importance to in our own society.

Finally, what would generally be known as the “new threats” to American security, the kind of international issues which were probably not all that apparent even a few years ago — international terrorism or nonproliferation, the fight against international drug trade, some international environment issues, a whole range of new security threats of one form or another — also have become very key to our foreign policy agenda.

Q: How are we dealing with these “new threats”?

TARNOFF: Let me give you an example. On the proliferation question, the United States has taken the lead for some years in trying to make sure that there was an international regime which would discourage proliferation and, if necessary, take international action against proliferators.

That’s why the United States has led the effort to try to replace the COCOM regime — the regime that was in place during the Cold War to limit the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact — and to revise that understanding so that rogue nations — countries whose intentions we and others have real doubts about, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea — could be denied international access to the kind of technology which would assist programs for nuclear weapons, chemical

weapons, biological weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction. That's one area in which we have been exceptionally active. The same can be said of environment and drug control. Because basically we are dealing with problems which cannot be solved within national borders.

Q: Religious and ethnic conflicts seem to abound on the current international scene, conflicts that are not necessarily a direct threat to our borders but that can create instability among nations with which we have alliances or upon which we depend. How is the United States responding to those situations? Do you have new policies to deal with ethnic and religious conflict?

TARNOFF: Yes, I think we do. And you are absolutely right that ethnic and religious conflicts have become much more prevalent around the world. Ironically, with the disappearance of dictatorial regimes, some very old and ancient hatreds have re-emerged. Within countries or between countries we have seen many examples of this around the world.

There are ways that the United States can work with others to both prevent and contain these conflicts. Obviously, it's much better if they can be prevented. And in this regard, we have worked very hard, principally with regional organizations around the world, to see whether there could not be in place, on a regional basis, organizations which would be able to anticipate potential conflicts, either between countries or within countries.

Many of the dispute mechanisms that have been developed are working reasonably well. For example, the United States, working with three other countries — Argentina, Brazil and Chile — has been quite active in trying to contain and resolve the long-festering dispute in South America between Ecuador and Peru, which flared up again last year.

But if the disputes themselves break out into conflict, we have demonstrated again that the United States is prepared to work with others. That's, after all, why and how we are in Bosnia. We are in Bosnia because further conflict there would not only represent a humanitarian tragedy but could ignite instability elsewhere in the Balkans — and also because the United States has a

sense that it's necessary to have international institutions in place which can work with such countries, preventively if possible but after the conflict has broken out, if necessary, so as to be able to contain them and offer to the leaders of the political movements involved, incentives — real incentives — to try to work out their differences peacefully.

Q: Do you believe the end of the Cold War has improved the human rights situation around the world?

TARNOFF: Yes, for the most part, I think the end of the Cold War has enhanced the human rights, the civic rights, of people around the world. When you think of the hundreds of millions of men and women in both the Soviet Union and the countries dominated by the Soviet Union and when you look at what has happened in those societies with respect to openness and freer markets, it really is quite remarkable.

And I see therefore around the world — but especially in places like East and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and in our own hemisphere in Latin America as well as in Asia — increasingly representative societies which are more responsive to the needs and desires of their people, even if the form is not always one that we can recognize from our own practices.

Q: What is the United States doing to foster this trend?

TARNOFF: Our policy is very clear. And that is that we will support and speak publicly, if necessary, about countries which are moving to improve the representative character of their government, the human rights of their citizens. And if, on the other hand, countries restrict and repress their populations, they will hear from the United States. And this will affect our bilateral relations.

We also are increasingly active in international organizations in this regard. For example at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the United States has taken the lead in drawing attention to regimes around the world which continue to ignore international covenants and international pressure to reduce the abuses and increase the responsibility of their people in shaping their own political future.

Q: What about relations with other major powers? How have they changed now that the confrontation with the Soviet Union is history?

TARNOFF: It is certainly important for the United States to maintain close and good relations with the major powers around the world. But unlike the Cold War era, we have to fashion our policy approaches with the other major powers almost on a case-by-case basis. It's quite interesting that when you come to a political issue or an economic issue of overriding importance to the United States, we find ourselves with different countries on our side and different countries opposing us on an issue-by-issue basis.

During the Cold War, when we were consumed by the very real threat of Soviet aggression, Soviet expansionism, it was easier for a group of basically like-minded countries, principally in the West, to have similarity of views on a whole range of issues. That's less automatic now, and therefore it requires that we build this coalition on an issue-by-issue basis. We are basically satisfied with the results that we've obtained, but it is certainly more complicated now than it was before.

Q: You have already mentioned the United Nations in one context, but how does the United States in general see the role of international institutions now?

TARNOFF: We are great believers in both the United Nations and regional organizations. We believe that it's in the U.S. national interest for these international organizations to play an expanding role not only in peacekeeping — where much of the attention of the U.N. has been directed — but also in dealing with health and hunger, population, environment. Those kinds of issues have to be handled on an international basis, and therefore worldwide organizations clearly have a role.

At the same time, many of these organizations require reform. They were designed in many cases a half-century ago in times which were quite different from ours. Some of them have, quite frankly, not been as attentive as they probably should have to the need to impose rigorous financial requirements and qualitative controls on the operation. If it is possible for such

international organizations, including the United Nations, to adapt to current circumstances and to be responsive to the interests of the United States and other major powers, I think that it is certainly important for us to continue to support them.

Q: U.S. officials have consistently stressed that the United States should and will remain engaged in the world and accept a leadership role. Can you give me some elements involved in that and how can you be sure that the country is willing to accept such a role?

TARNOFF: The issue of America's role in the world is, of course, a very important one, and I suspect will, not only this election year but for many years to come, be actively debated. The administration's position is very clear. We think that the personal interests of our citizens, economic as well as security, are better served if the United States takes a leadership position in the world. And that's why we favor active internationalism. It's not for some theoretical reason. It's because in a whole range of specific ways we believe that we have to defend the interests of the American people and that requires us to be active internationally.

Now there are voices in this country which take a different position. There are some who would like to have us retreat from the world, give up responsibilities, try to close down our borders to a certain extent — not only to people but to trade and to ideas. To those we would say, "How do you address some of these transnational problems? How do you work on international crime or terrorism if you don't have open relationships, cooperative relationships, with many countries around the world?"

There are also some voices in this country in favor of a unilateralism, basically having the United States take actions alone. Of course the President has to be able to use military force, if necessary alone, if he so decides. But when we think of the actions that the United States has taken to defend our interests around the world, it has certainly been to our advantage to cooperate with others — NATO in particular, but also in other places around the world — so that we can share the burden and share responsibility and not have to take the full burden upon us. Active internationalism is something that is of highest importance to President Clinton and

Secretary Christopher, and they will continue to defend such a posture very vigorously.

Q: You have outlined the foreign policy that the United States has been implementing. Has it been successful in achieving its goals? What are the key foreign policy accomplishments?

TARNOFF: I believe — and this is an insider's view of course — that we have been successful in some critical respects. First of all, we have begun to define the foreign policy interests of the United States in new ways. Secondly, we have set out some longer-term priorities and goals — objectives that probably cannot be reached in the course of a year or even an administration.

In the economic sphere, for example, we have concluded almost 20 trade agreements with Japan and the trade balance with Japan, while still troublesome in many respects, is nevertheless improving to our advantage as a result of an enormous amount of work, undertaken under the leadership of the President but with many others involved.

In the area of crisis management and responding to some of the alarming situations which have happened either on our watch or which we inherited — whether they be in Bosnia or Haiti — I think that the United States has shown that here, again, we are capable of working with others so as to bring about a more stable political situation and also — and this reflects American values and interests — reducing the scope of humanitarian tragedy.

Obviously a lot more needs to be done. There are countries around the world which represent a threat from either a terrorist or a weapons of mass destruction perspective. And they have to be watched and contained. There is always the chance of humanitarian

tragedy, either provoked by political leaders or as a result of an act of nature. But I would like to think that increasingly we have some guidelines for action. We know where we have to intervene. We have to of course be mindful of the fact that we cannot do anything substantial without the support of the American people, but the American people are showing increased understanding that their own interests are caught up in America's international role and therefore I think we are able to make our case increasingly effectively.

Q: What are the most critical problems and biggest challenges ahead?

TARNOFF: I think the biggest problems ahead involve areas of international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which, again, we can begin to contain with a good deal of international cooperation. But there remain rogue states out there that are in our view determined to be able to retain their potential for acts of extreme violence around the world. And they have to be monitored. And in some cases, given the advances in technologies, it takes very small groups or even individuals alone to set off an explosive device and provoke a substantial political and humanitarian crisis. We have to be mindful of that.

In addition, I think we have the challenge before us of improving the kinds of international structures that I was talking about before, making sure that the United Nations and regional organizations but also the international economic organs — the North American Free Trade Agreement or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum — are working constructively so as to promote open societies and open markets. And here I think the United States has always had a leading role, and I hope we continue to exercise it. ●

JAPAN AND KOREA — TWO EXAMPLES OF U.S. COMMITMENT IN ASIA

*By Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*

President Clinton's recent visit to Japan and South Korea underlined the strength of the U.S. commitment in "two particularly important areas of the Clinton administration's foreign policy toward Asia," says the author. In Japan, he notes, the President reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan alliance provides "a fundamental element of stability" of benefit to the whole region in a period of change; in the Republic of Korea, Clinton and President Kim initiated a process aimed at reducing tensions and achieving a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. USIA Program Officer Jim Kelman was editorial coordinator of this article.

No region is more important for the United States than the Asia-Pacific region. In this vast area, most of the world's people live, many of the richest cultures flourish, the most dynamic economies beckon, and the major powers intersect. It is a region where America has abiding security interests, having fought three bloody wars during the past half century. Forty percent of our trade is with this area — half again as large as our trade with Western Europe and increasing more rapidly than that with any other region. The increased flow of talented immigrants from Asia over the past quarter century has created strong new bonds across the Pacific.

The end of the Cold War has brought great change and opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region. It evokes an awareness of the past and calls for a vision of the future. Inspired by this pressing need to meet the challenges of this new age and to ensure the security, economic vigor and freedom of the American people, President Clinton has articulated his vision for the region — a Pacific community built on shared strength, shared prosperity and shared commitment to democratic values.

I would like to address two particularly important areas of the Clinton administration's foreign policy toward Asia — Japan and the Korean Peninsula — in the wake of President Clinton's very successful April trip.

JAPAN

As President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto have recently reaffirmed, the U.S.-Japan alliance is our most important security commitment in the region; the U.S.-Japan partnership is the foundation of our Asia policy. While indeed some question the rationale for this alliance now that the threat of the Soviet Union no longer exists, we would answer that in the post-Cold War period of change, the U.S.-Japan alliance is targeted against the uncertainties which confront the U.S., Japan and the region. Like our other alliances, it is a fundamental element of stability that benefits — and is appreciated by — all in the region.

Our alliance with Japan is based on the Mutual Security Treaty which, along with our 100,000 military personnel stationed in the Pacific, allows the U.S. to protect enduring political, economic and security interests. The present situation in North Korea by itself illustrates the continued importance of our bilateral political and security ties with Japan.

President Clinton's visit highlighted three important elements of our relationship with Japan. First, the overall broad nature of our partnership was brought into focus. Second, the security declaration leaves no doubt about the solidity of our ties. Third, Defense Secretary Perry, in his visit, capped an effort which has been going on for some time now, with U.S. and

Japanese officials working closely together, on security matters and the concerns of the people on Okinawa. The progress which we have achieved on that issue reflects our sensitivities to the presence of our bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan. At the same time, there will be no impact on our capabilities.

We have rich diplomatic cooperation with Japan. This occurs not only in the region but around the world as Japan steps up to its international responsibilities. Japan is participating in several U.N. peacekeeping operations. It has made a major contribution to the Middle East peace process, to Bosnia and other parts of the world. The U.S. supports Japan's admission to the U.N. Security Council as a permanent member.

Another aspect of the relationship which was underscored by the President's visit is the Common Agenda, where our two countries are working together on a wide range of global issues such as HIV/AIDS and environmental issues. We were also able to highlight cooperation on two other problems of a global nature: the attempt to eradicate polio around the world, and increased cooperation on natural disasters occurring in the region.

In the economic dimension, we have worked diligently in recent years, and our hard work and mutual efforts have paid off in considerable success. There have been 21 agreements reached between our two countries, and trade figures have been moving in the right direction, reflecting the progress both on the macroeconomic front and the sectoral and structural fronts. Our exports to Japan have risen 34 percent, and exports in areas in which we have been negotiating, 85 percent. Our trade deficit last year was down roughly 9 percent. We are pleased with the progress, although we must ensure faithful implementation of agreements and deal with unfinished business.

KOREAN PENINSULA

When the Clinton administration first entered office in January of 1993, one of the world's most urgent security challenges was the North Korean nuclear program. Only a year and a half ago, North Korea — bent on development of a large nuclear weapons capability — had nuclear reactors both operational and under

construction of a type designed to maximize the production of weapons grade plutonium. Left unchecked, this program would have been capable of producing enough plutonium for at least several nuclear weapons annually. Such a nuclear stockpile in the hands of the North Korean regime would have been a grave threat to the region and U.S. interests around the world.

The Agreed Framework has frozen North Korea's nuclear program in its tracks. North Korea's operational reactor and its reprocessing facility are sealed, construction has stopped on two new reactors, and U.S. experts have begun, with North Korean cooperation, to place the plutonium-laden spent fuel in safe storage pending its eventual removal from North Korea. The freeze is being effectively monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has recently agreed with North Korea on procedures for the resumption of ad hoc and routine inspections of nuclear facilities not subject to the freeze.

The Agreed Framework will produce a full accounting of the history of the DPRK nuclear program before it receives key nuclear components for the light water reactors we are committed to provide under the agreement. When fully implemented, the Agreed Framework will result in the dismantlement of North Korea's dangerous gas-graphite reactors and related facilities, including the DPRK's reprocessing plant. These steps go far beyond what the DPRK would have been required to do under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows member states to reprocess spent fuel under IAEA safeguards. Ensuring that the Agreed Framework is successfully implemented is, therefore, a major goal — and one which we are pursuing with full knowledge that we may face serious challenges in the future.

Our approach is founded on our rock solid relationship with the Republic of Korea. Our ties were forged in the crucible of war. They have been cemented by an alliance that has endured for 40 years. They have been nurtured by long established patterns of close consultation and cooperation. As Koreans have built an economic miracle, our bilateral trade has expanded rapidly, reaching about 50 billion dollars last year and making Korea our fifth largest market. And as Koreans have developed their own democratic institutions, a

commitment to shared values has strengthened the bonds between our two peoples.

A process aimed at achieving a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula has been initiated under the four party peace proposal announced by President Clinton and President Kim on April 16.

The proposal calls for a meeting of representatives of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and the United States as soon as possible and without preconditions. The two leaders agreed that this peace process should address a wide range of measures to reduce tensions.

Both presidents also agreed that South and North Korea should take the lead in a renewed search for a permanent peace arrangement and that separate negotiations between the United States and North Korea on peace-related issues cannot be considered.

It is our fundamental long-standing principle that the issues of peace and reunification must be resolved by the Korean people themselves. While President Clinton has underscored the U.S. commitment to support and facilitate the peace process, he also has emphasized that the "future of the Korean Peninsula lies in the hands of its people." ●

GOALS IN AFRICA: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, PEACE, ECONOMIC GROWTH

An interview with George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

U.S. policy toward Africa stresses support for democracy building, conflict resolution and prevention, and promoting sustainable economic growth, says Moose. “At this moment in history,” he notes, “the United States has a unique opportunity to help Africa’s people form the institutions and leaders they need to create the change they — and we — are seeking on the continent.”

This interview was conducted by USIA staff writer Peg McKay.

QUESTION: What are the major overall goals of U.S. policy toward Africa?

MOOSE: First, we seek to support African efforts to establish democratic governments and institutions. We want to use our influence to promote real democracy, stressing transparent governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Second, we want to promote an end to current conflict, and help prevent future ones.

Third, we are using our vast experience in international development and business to help Africans achieve sustainable economic growth, so that the future will be better than the present.

Q: What progress has been made in democracy building in Africa, and what is the United States doing to promote it?

MOOSE: Today, we see strong democratic successes, like Namibia, Benin, South Africa and Mali. We see countries which began well and stumbled, like Niger, and we see countries that have taken steps backward — The Gambia, Sudan, and Nigeria, to name three. Africa’s progress has been neither linear nor monolithic, but there has been progress: In 1989 there were only five African countries that could be described as democracies; today there are twenty-three.

Democracy is a culture that cannot be imposed but must be developed from within. We must take advantage of opportunities that arise and be ready to

work with different groups — governments, legislatures, parliaments, civic associations, judiciary, press and the private sector. At this moment in history, the United States has a unique opportunity to help Africa’s people form the institutions and leaders they need to create the change they — and we — are seeking on the continent.

Q: What are the major peacekeeping issues the United States is dealing with in Africa, and what steps is it taking to help resolve them?

MOOSE: There are lingering, in fact bitter, conflicts on the African continent and much of our effort, extending well back before this administration, has been to bring those conflicts to resolution. There have been some notable successes: the effort in Mozambique, which culminated in the elections last November, and the current effort in Angola, which has resulted in a new peace agreement which we are now working hard to assure the implementation of.

In other conflicts — such as the ones in Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi — where we have engaged our own diplomacy in an effort to support African peace initiatives, those efforts have been frustrating in many respects. But the human costs of these conflicts, as well as the cost borne by American taxpayers in their generous response to those who are caught up in them, makes it imperative that we continue our efforts, and we are doing so.

We are also trying hard to find ways to anticipate and avert future conflicts. Here I would point primarily to our collaboration with the Organization of African

Unity (OAU) and sub-regional organizations in Africa. I think we are seeing in the OAU a renewed commitment on the part of Africans themselves to assume a greater role in conflict prevention.

In cases where we can't avoid conflicts, we also need to enhance the capacity of our organizations, both international and regional, to respond to conflict. And here again, we've been working with our partners in Europe — the European Union and others — to ensure that democratic African nations, which have a strong record and reputation for participating in international peacekeeping and regional peacekeeping, have the means to do that.

Q: With Congress moving to cut the federal budget, do you see a reduction in U.S. economic assistance to Africa?

MOOSE: Very regrettably, just this past year, the budget that was approved by the Congress for foreign assistance and foreign programs was reduced by about 25 percent. We find that deeply troubling because it does severely impact on our capacity to pursue the objectives in Africa that we've touched on — democracy, conflict resolution/prevention and long-term sustainable development.

These reductions come precisely at a time when we are seeing an important transition taking hold in Africa. Over the last decade we have seen an increase in the number of countries moving toward democratic and economic reforms. With that we see the emergence of governments that are both more stable and more able to assume their proper role in dealing with their own internal problems as well as in cooperating with us and with others in dealing with major international problems.

It would be unfortunate if, because of our own declining support for these transitions, that transformation would falter. And I think we would find ourselves confronting further down the road some significant costs and consequences.

So it really is a moment for us of tremendous opportunity — an opportunity to consolidate what has already been achieved and an opportunity also to build on that for the future.

Q: You have spoken of a growing collaboration between the United States and African organizations that involves working with the private sector and regional African organizations. What is the U.S. doing to pursue this kind of collaboration?

MOOSE: Where we are most directly involved at the moment is in southern Africa. When Vice President Gore was in southern Africa last December he signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the secretariat of the Southern African Development Community — the grouping of 12 southern African states that has come together in an effort to form a southern African economic community. The objective, quite simply, is to try to help them fashion an arrangement that would permit the freer movement of goods and services and of people to create a larger commercial and investment space in southern Africa.

The economies in southern Africa are, for the most part, too small, too fragmented, to be attractive to major investment, to industrialization. Economic collaboration has to be a key to their future economic development and growth.

But equally key is the role of the private sector. The leaders of the region have rightly focussed on the notion of creating the economic and commercial framework which would enable the private sector, both African and international, to play a much more active role in energizing these economies.

So our contribution has been threefold: number one, we have certainly worked to encourage this development; secondly, we have provided expertise to share the experience we have had with other economic communities, including NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement). And thirdly, it has been to try to find ways to further encourage our own private sector to take a more active role in this part of the world.

Q: The United States was a strong supporter of South Africa's move from apartheid to multi-racial democracy. What is the state of its relations with the new Mandela government there?

MOOSE: I think first and foremost one has to look at what has been accomplished in South Africa just in the

last five years. A remarkable, some would even say miraculous transformation has occurred — a transformation that many predicted could never happen in a peaceful way. That more than anything else I think is a harbinger of promise and potential for South Africa's future.

South Africa now faces a number of challenges in trying to overcome the legacies of apartheid — the severe inequities in income, in social condition, in opportunity in that society. It is also undertaking a major revolution, if you will, in governmental terms. It has put in place a new form of government at the national level and it is also recreating, reinventing governments at the state and local levels.

In terms of our own relationship, clearly that transition has meant that the past, very strained relations with the apartheid South African government have given way to a very close collaboration with President Mandela and the current leadership of the government of national unity. In many respects we see in the United States and in South Africa a commitment to common causes, not least of which is the cause of demonstrating that multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-cultural societies can not only prosper but thrive in the new global situation in which we now live. And that I think has been one of the keystones of the strong official and personal relationships that have brought both of our countries together.

Q: How do international problems such as drugs, terrorism and crime affect U.S.-African relations and what steps is the United States taking to deal with them in Africa?

MOOSE: These threats — of disease, whether it's in the form of AIDS or Ebola; of narcotics trafficking, where we have to recall that roughly 30 to 40 percent of all of the hard narcotics that enter the United States come via African drug cartels; the risk of terrorism, which usually finds its roots in the discontent and deprivation that exist in underdeveloped parts of the world — all of these things are threats which increasingly dominate the U.S. security agenda.

These are problems which do not lend themselves to unilateral solution; they require cooperation and collaboration. It's only with governments who have common purposes and common principles that one can find that collaboration, and that is again another reason why we have attached such importance to support and encouragement for democracy in Africa. Our experience is that democracies are much more likely to have in common with us a shared concern for the impacts, for the consequences of these kinds of security concerns. ●

THE U.S. APPROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

*By Chris Dell
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*Enlargement of the area of stability and prosperity, inclusion of former adversaries, and integration of interested nations into one cooperative system are the principles on which the U.S. approach to European security is built, says the author, and he describes the six tracks on which they are pursued — plus a seventh track that will be a “practical laboratory” for the approach.
USIA staff writer Jacqui S. Porth was editorial coordinator for this article.*

We face two fundamental challenges. The first is to address security in Europe. I see the issue as reinforcing the enormous and powerful desire in Europe for integration and joining the structures of the West, which the new Central European democracies regard as their model for prosperity and security.

Success in reinforcing this desire for integration will help protect against the other very powerful force at work in Europe today — the risk of disintegration. The most obvious and tragic example is Bosnia.

The second foreign policy challenge is the need to renew the consensus that has sustained American engagement in Europe and in the world. The results of our approach after 1945 have been universally acknowledged as a resounding success. It would be foolish, however, to deny that the underlying consensus has eroded in the United States. There are some very natural, understandable reasons why.

The first reason is generational change. American leaders who fought World War II understood intuitively why America had to remain engaged in the world. Now a new generation of leaders is rising who have grown up in a period of great prosperity and for whom the siren song of isolationism is, perhaps, sweeter than it was for their predecessors.

The second reason, of course, is the changes that have come since the Cold War itself.

an effective and coherent foreign policy approach which is well designed to help meet the challenges that we face — both in Europe and the process through which we will succeed in renewing the consensus for American engagement.

Under President Clinton, the U.S. has been engaged in a process of defining not what we stand against but what we stand for in this new era. We stand for European enlargement — of the zone of Western values, stability and prosperity; inclusiveness — of former adversaries in this zone; and integration — of all interested Europeans into one cooperative system. These are the fundamental principles that unify our approach toward security and stability in Europe today.

The U.S. is pursuing a broad approach to security. In Europe, security can no longer be defined in a traditional sense as military security or defensive arrangements. It is necessary to think also of the political, economic, and social dimensions.

Yet, there is no single European institution today that is either capable or designed to address all of those aspects of security. It would be asking too much of NATO or the European Union or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) — to assume the entire burden. These institutions were not designed for that. Instead, each has special skills and strengths and our approach is designed to take advantage of the unique

capabilities of each one and to try to create an interlocking web of cooperative security arrangements in which all countries can belong; where integration is no longer defined as membership in the sense of belonging to the club but integration through practical, cooperative arrangements working together in pursuit of common goals.

This broad approach has led to six “tracks.”

The first is admission of new members to the North Atlantic Alliance itself.

Second, while we work steadily and deliberately toward the growth of NATO, we are vigorously pursuing a closer and more cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. If one looks back at some of the ministerial disagreements of 1994, for example, we’ve made considerable progress, once again putting NATO-Russia relations back on a very positive track.

Russia has now implemented its Partnership for Peace Program (PFP) and begun working with the Alliance on its relationship beyond PFP and we are engaged in the initial stages of a dialogue with Russia about a framework for future relations between the Alliance and Russia. More recently, practical command relations have been ironed out and applied in Bosnia, which is a very hopeful sign for the future.

The third track is PFP. The U.S. government views the program as already having established itself as a lasting feature of the European security landscape. It offers great future possibilities because it is the first institution premised on the criteria of partnership, cooperation and integration rather than on “membership” in the narrow sense of the word.

PFP is designed to be a series of individual relationships between partner countries and the Alliance in which the partners themselves define the degree and extent of cooperation desired with NATO. That can be as much or as little as meets the security interests and concerns of the partner country.

The fourth element is the administration’s support for the growing integration of the European Union as well as its enlargement. It sees integration and enlargement

as complementing the growth of the other institutions and the enlargement of NATO.

The fifth track is the desire to expand the already very thick and interesting web of ties between the United States and Europe. We recognize that with the growing integration of Europe, we need to find new and additional means of cooperation between the U.S. and Europe — Europe qua the European Union. This is one of the most interesting challenges before us over the next couple of years. The Transatlantic Initiative, announced in Madrid in December, 1995, has less to do with economics and more to do with the idea of global partnership in the political sphere.

The sixth track is support for the growth, strengthening and deepening of the OSCE. The OSCE has proven to be an extremely useful and interesting institution. The OSCE has achieved more, perhaps, much more, than even its founders ever thought it would.

Future growth of the OSCE lies in its ability to deal with crisis- and conflict-prevention or conflict resolution. In the past few years, the OSCE’s role has grown and it now has field missions in 12 countries in the former Soviet Union. These missions consist of a vast variety of activities, including election-monitoring and seminars on ethnic and nationality disputes in some of the Baltic States.

The growth of the OSCE is going to be challenged nowhere so much as in Bosnia, where the OSCE is going to be called upon to participate fully in the implementation of the Dayton Accords through election-monitoring and conflict resolution and many of the specialized techniques it has developed over the 20 years of this history.

Bosnia — the seventh track of U.S. policy — will be the practical laboratory in which many of these theoretical, abstract ideas are going to be subject to a very realistic, severe test. The arrangements include new partner nations working alongside NATO for the first time: Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, and several other partner countries who are making their national territory available to support Operation Joint Endeavor. Bosnia will be an exciting place for our partners to learn to work with the Alliance

and for us to learn more about them. We are also looking to the European Union to play a large role in Bosnia, helping with economic and social reconstruction.

In terms of American consensus, the Dayton Accords brought about a shift in the political atmosphere in Washington in favor of a large American role in Bosnia.

There are real good reasons to be confident about the role of America in the future. There is no difference between American and European interests. There is a common Transatlantic community where interests and values are the same. As the only remaining superpower, America doesn't pretend that it can be everything to everybody and to do so alone. The Alliance will be enlarged with other states who share common democratic and economic values with us with us and who share our interest in sustaining America's role in the world toward new engagements.

One of the important things about the Transatlantic Initiative is that, for the first time, we can find an action agenda where the United States and Europe are looking together to do things beyond the borders of Europe. While little noticed until now, this will likely be of major significance because we are really asking Europe to look beyond the narrow crescent of states most immediately on its borders, to resume that historic and global role it once played. To the extent that Europeans are willing to be engaged, it will have a reciprocal benefit of sustaining America's willingness to also be engaged. While this is very difficult to do and to sustain, it is also probably the most indispensable task we face as a partnership of common values. ●

SUMMIT PROCESS HELPING THE AMERICAS SOLVE JOINT PROBLEMS

An interview with Ambassador Richard C. Brown, Senior Coordinator, Summit of the Americas

The summit process, begun at Miami's Summit of the Americas in 1994 with the aim of strengthening democracy, alleviating poverty, and building economic integration and sustainable development in the Western Hemisphere, has given the democratic countries of the hemisphere "the basis for a common view of how to solve some of our basic problems," says the ambassador. And, he notes, the continuing process of meetings includes all of the nations of the hemisphere except Fidel Castro's Cuba.

Brown formerly served as ambassador to Uruguay and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs.

This interview was conducted by USIA staff writer Wendy S. Ross.

QUESTION: The Clinton administration has promoted the summit process — a continuing series of meetings of Western Hemisphere leaders — as a way to strengthen democracy and promote economic prosperity in the hemisphere. Ambassador Brown, you play a key role in that process. How successful has it been?

BROWN: Since the Miami summit meeting in December 1994, the countries of the region have made rather remarkable progress in implementing the 23 action initiatives that the 34 democratically-elected presidents signed. The summit agenda was broad. It covered four major areas: strengthening democracy, economic integration of the hemisphere, alleviation of poverty, and sustainable development — what we are going to do about protecting the environment.

To get 34 countries to agree on an agenda so diverse was nothing short of a miracle. But we did it by consensus. It took us about seven months to negotiate the summit documents, and I think we were all rather pleased, but also very surprised, with the results we had achieved.

Q: The recent trade ministerial meeting in Cartagena was criticized for its failure to come to a decision on the procedures to be used for negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Does this mean the summit process is in trouble?

BROWN: No, not at all. We have made enormous steps forward in the trade area. We had one ministerial in Denver in June of 1995 which elaborated on the action

plan spelled out in Miami. The Denver agreement established seven inter-American working groups on critical trade issues inside the region — issues like customs regulations and phytosanitary regulations, all of the nitty gritty issues that are necessary to address in reducing barriers in the hemisphere. The terms of reference for those issues were spelled out in Denver. The ministerial meeting held in March 1996 in Cartagena advanced this process further by setting up four more international working groups. Now there are 11 such groups that are constantly working to address issues such as improving the intellectual property regimes in each country. So we've made leaps forward since Miami, both in Denver and in Cartagena.

Of course, there are going to be differences in a community of nations of 34 friends, who are all democratic and naturally given to speaking their minds and protecting their interests. But this is not going to hold us back from getting to a free trade area by the year 2005. Every country in the hemisphere is dedicated to achieving that goal by that year. So, we're going to have a few bumps in the road here and there, but we are making steady progress, and I'm convinced we are going to make it.

Q: The summit process is not only about trade. It's also about strengthening democracy and preventing corruption and drug trafficking. What other initiatives has the process produced?

BROWN: That's an excellent point. Because trade is so very important it often does capture the headlines. But we have to emphasize that there are 22 other initiatives that are going on in the implementation process to realize the goals that were spelled out in Miami.

In the area of strengthening democratic institutions we have made some great strides. For example, in Buenos Aires in December 1995 all the ministers of justice of the hemisphere signed onto a communique dealing with money laundering. This is an absolute first in this hemisphere, and a first in the world, as far as defining precisely what the money laundering problem is and what kind of steps the governments are pledging to take to get at this problem. So this is a great stride forward and means a great deal to all of our populations in the hemisphere.

In Caracas in March 1996, under the auspices of the Organization of American States, an anti-corruption convention was signed, also a first in the history of this hemisphere. This convention put in a codified form provisions to get at the problem of corruption, one of the items which has been eating at the innards of the democratic institutions of the hemisphere. We, in effect, in this hemisphere are adopting some of the provisions which the United States has long had in its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prevents our corporations from engaging in any sort of under-the-table payment to foreigners in getting contracts or winning bids.

It should be pointed out that this proposal was not pushed forward by the United States. This was something that the Latin Americans and the Caribbeans wanted, and they are the ones who put it on the agenda and in the action plan in Miami. And they are the ones who are the driving force behind getting this convention signed.

Q: How will these agreements change relations in the hemisphere?

BROWN: The anti-corruption convention as well as the money laundering communique — and there are others; we are working on an anti-terrorist agreement — indicate that for the first time in the history of this hemisphere we are working on a common agenda that

all of us have agreed to, and we are dedicated to carrying out the action plan we all signed onto in Miami. There has been a sea change in our whole relationship in the hemisphere. We are now working on critical issues that have direct impact on our populations, whether it has to do with counter-narcotics or corruption or terrorism or trade; all of these things are going to impact upon us, upon our children and our grandchildren. So this is a very profound kind of change that has been wrought by the Summit of the Americas in Miami — these are the tangible follow-on products of that effort.

Q: Looking back on your long foreign service career, much of it dealing with Latin America, what are the most profound changes you see in U.S. relations with the countries of the hemisphere?

BROWN: We now have the basis for a common view of how to solve some of our basic problems. In looking back on the history of our relationships in the Western Hemisphere, we can see very clearly the change embodied in 1994 in Miami. There have been only three summits in the history of the hemisphere: one in 1956, another in 1967, and finally the one in 1994. The previous two summits produced little more than some photo opportunities. The reason: we did not agree on some of the fundamentals. There was not a common consensus in the hemisphere in those days that democracy, in spite of all its inefficiencies and difficulties, was the best form of government. We and quite a few others in the hemisphere believed that democracy was the only way, but there were others who did not. By the time of Miami, all the leaders who attended were democratically elected.

On the question of how to achieve development and production in an economy, that also changed radically over the years in Latin America. We now have a general agreement that market-oriented economies produce better than those that are state-oriented. There used to be semi-state-controlled economies in much of Latin America, where governments owned huge segments of the economy. Now they are privatizing. They have been privatizing for the last 10 years steadily. So changed viewpoints on those two basic assumptions were absolutely key in what has happened in the hemisphere.

And, of course, there is another factor in all of this. We grew up with the idea of the Cold War. We were fighting against the Soviet Union and the encroachment it was making in this hemisphere through its surrogate, Cuba — the one government, by the way, that wasn't invited to the table in Miami.

Now the Cold War is gone. The Marxist system has been shown to be a system as economically bankrupt as it was politically. We didn't have to have that element present and hovering over the presidents while they were meeting in Miami. And it freed us up, each of us, to talk about the issues facing each of our societies and each of our economies. We made real progress.

Q: You noted that Cuba was the only country not invited to the Miami summit. What is the United States' current relationship with the Castro regime?

BROWN: Well, as we have often said, if Castro would become a democrat and would introduce democratic reforms, and respect human rights in his country, then we would be prepared to do an awful lot of things together. But so long as he persists in hanging onto ideas that are long past and irrelevant, and persists in remaining the hemisphere's sole dictator, we are going to find it very, very difficult to find any common ground on which to meet. ●

MIDDLE EAST PRIORITIES: PEACE PROCESS, PERSIAN GULF SECURITY

*By Robert H. Pelletreau
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs*

The two biggest U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the area, says the author, are actively supporting the parties engaged in the Middle East peace process “as they take further risks for peace and the practical steps necessary for reconciliation,” and “promoting stability and security in the Persian Gulf” to ensure the free flow of Arabian oil upon which the prosperity of the world economy depends. USIA staff writer Ralph Dannheisser was editorial coordinator for this article, which was adapted from a speech to the Women’s National Democratic Club in Washington earlier this year.

There are few areas in the world today where so many different and important American interests come together as in the Middle East. Let me list a few of the issues that keep us busy:

- Securing Arab-Israeli peace
- Preserving Israel’s security and well-being
- Ensuring the free flow of oil from the Gulf
- Containing threats posed by Iran, Iraq and Libya
- Combating terrorism
- Checking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Ensuring access for U.S. business, and
- Promoting more open political and economic systems and respect for human rights.

Because of the importance of all these interests, the only sensible American policy toward this vital region — in fact the only possible one — is active and sustained engagement. Let me focus on our two biggest initiatives: the Arab-Israeli peace process and Gulf security.

PEACE PROCESS

Securing a just, lasting and comprehensive peace is a cornerstone of this administration’s overall foreign policy. The agreements we have achieved over the last two years and the ensuing expansion of political and economic contacts form the foundation of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, signed on the White House lawn a little more than two years ago and sealed with a handshake between late Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat, was an historic breakthrough that gave new impetus to the diplomatic process. For Israel, it began a process which could relieve it of the heavy moral and political burden of ruling a hostile foreign population and bring greater security and well-being to its people. And for the Palestinians, it has opened the way to self-government and the joy and responsibility of taking charge of their daily lives.

The United States has worked actively to support the parties as they take further risks for peace and the practical steps necessary for reconciliation. We are heartened by the agreements reached by Israel and the Palestinians, who have been engaged in almost continuous negotiations since 1993, and we have remained in constant communication with both parties — offering encouragement, helping overcome differences and lending our support.

The structure of the overall process has also helped in this regard. It consists of three separate but complementary levels of interaction — bilateral between Israel and specific negotiating partners; multilateral involving groups of states meeting to discuss regional issues such as water and the environment; and international, in which the international community is called together for a supportive event such as a donors’ conference to

support Palestinian economic development or an economic summit to promote regional integration and mobilize the business community to take advantage of new opportunities opened up by the peace process.

This has meant that when difficulties developed on one level, we could use activities on the other levels to buffer and bridge the problem. This negotiating architecture, while complex, has proven to be very productive.

The interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, which was signed at the White House last September, transformed the visionary commitment to peace in the Declaration of Principles into a set of practical steps that foster day-to-day cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. The 400-page agreement extending Palestinian self-rule throughout the West Bank demonstrated to the world that both sides were serious about moving forward and meeting each other's practical requirements through negotiation and compromise. Even the enormous tragedy of Prime Minister Rabin's assassination by an Israeli extremist had the unintended consequence of reinforcing support for peace. The international response to his untimely death has made clear how much the world supports the peacemakers and how little the enemies of peace gain from opposing them. The Israeli response, particularly among the nation's youth, reaffirmed the deep longing for a just and secure peace.

There is no turning back. Since signing the accord, Israel has redeployed its forces from six major West Bank cities and hundreds of villages. Palestinian institutions of self-government which did not exist two years ago have arisen throughout Gaza and the West Bank.

One key element in ensuring a democratic future is to bring positive practical change to the lives of people who for decades have known little but conflict, mistrust and poverty. The United States has taken the lead in marshaling international financial support for the Palestinians so that they can build for themselves the kind of economic and political structures that will undergird and ensure the peace.

The United States looks beyond the successes of Israeli-Palestinian relations to our long-term goal of a comprehensive peace that spans the entire Middle East. Promoting regional peace advances a range of American interests while underlining our unshakable commitment to Israel's security and well-being.

The emerging peace is a complicated pattern, and the new relationships are unfolding at different rates. There is still much work to be done to consolidate recent gains and energize further steps. We will be there to support and nurture this trend and to find and seize new opportunities for peace. It is a foreign policy priority and a genuine commitment of our government from President Clinton and Secretary Christopher on down.

GULF SECURITY

While I can easily run on about the successes of our peace process diplomacy, it is important to call attention also to the vital interest we have in promoting stability and security in the Persian Gulf. This is not just a preference; it's a requirement. The security and prosperity of the American economy and indeed the entire world at this point in time depend on the free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the vast reserves of the Arabian Peninsula. That means we need to contain rogue states like Iran and Iraq, both of which trample on international norms of behavior and strive to dominate this enormously wealthy and strategic area.

It has been five years since the United States and nearly three dozen other nations launched Operation Desert Storm, an extraordinary multinational operation which drove Saddam Hussein's occupation forces from Kuwait. It would not have been possible without the determined leadership of the United States. Our engagement was essential to turn back Iraq's mind-boggling act of international piracy and prevent a ruthless dictator from controlling a major share of the world's oil and exercising a blackmailing political influence over the entire region.

We have seen a certain amount of revisionist criticism — that the coalition somehow lost the war, or at least did not win it properly. Some argue in comfortable retrospect that the coalition forces should have continued on to Baghdad and removed the dictator

from power. Tempting as such a proposition sounds, in reality neither the coalition nor our Arab partners would have been able to support such an overreaching of our international mandate.

The balance sheet of Operation Desert Storm from the viewpoint of American interests was clearly a success. In a short battle with few American casualties, Western oil supplies were safeguarded, Iraq's quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was checked, Israeli and Saudi Arabian security were guaranteed against missile attacks and possibly even invasion, Saddam Hussein was branded an international pariah and his threat to the region sharply diminished, and the most vital period in the history of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations was launched.

It is regrettable, particularly to the people of Iraq, that the government in Baghdad remains defiant toward the will of its people and the international community. International resolve has reduced and contained, but not eliminated, the danger it poses. For this reason, it is essential that the various U.N. sanctions on Iraq remain fully in effect until Iraq fulfills all the obligations placed on it by the U.N. Security Council.

The other major threat in the region comes from Iran, which supports international terrorism, violently opposes the Middle East peace process, and is striving to acquire nuclear weapons and other sophisticated armaments. In the absence of U.N. resolutions, Iran

poses a more subtle and complex challenge to our diplomacy. Some of our key allies, lured by commercial opportunity, have been too tolerant of Iran's outlaw behavior.

We have called on all the major industrial states to join the United States in denying Iran arms, nuclear technology, and preferential economic treatment. Their response has been only partially supportive despite our patient and ongoing discussions with them. We are, therefore, working with the Congress to devise more thorough-going and effective measures to encourage the international community to put additional pressure on Iran to bring its behavior up to international norms.

We are convinced that only through steady pressure and the imposition of real economic costs will Iran's leaders be persuaded to give up their aggressive policies and become a less threatening neighbor in the region.

This administration has committed itself to peacemaking and the containment of those threatening the stability of the region. Through our leadership, we are responding to the highest traditions of our nation and our people. We must continue to work for a brighter future for the Middle East and for ourselves — a future marked by widening peace and cooperation, increased security and greater prosperity. ●

LESSENING TENSIONS IS FOCUS OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA

An interview with Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs

Helping to scale down regional tensions is the “key concern” of U.S. foreign policy in South Asia, according to Raphel, but she says the U.S. is also supporting efforts there to promote economic development, protect the environment, enforce human rights, and combat narcotics production and trafficking. This interview was conducted by USIA foreign service officer Jean Vander Woude and intern Hala S. Harik.

QUESTION: What are the major U.S. policy concerns in South Asia?

RAPHEL: We have put a greater focus on South Asia at the end of the Cold War and as India has started to join the global mainstream both economically and politically. South Asia is a region undergoing rapid transformation, so we have increasingly focused on it.

Our key concern there, as it is in other parts of the world as well, is to help find ways to lessen regional tensions. There are tensions between India and Pakistan and within various of the states. In Sri Lanka, for example, there is an ongoing civil conflict. There has been a lot of trouble in Bangladesh recently, although the situation may well be improving there. They have agreed to an interim government, and they are looking forward to elections this summer. And Afghanistan, of course, is the source of a lot of instability.

In addition, we are concerned with finding a way to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Promoting trade and investment and economic growth and development is another key goal. Promoting democracy and human rights, of course, has been a big issue for this administration. Finding ways to protect the environment, both in individual countries and on a regional basis, is another concern. Combating narcotics production and trafficking is also a big issue in South Asia.

Q: What is the United States doing to encourage peaceful relations in the region?

RAPHEL: I think the first thing to realize is that the problems in the region ultimately have to be solved by the people and the governments themselves. We certainly urge them to resolve their differences through negotiation rather than fighting.

In Kashmir, as we have long said, India and Pakistan must work out their dispute, taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Pakistan has long asked for outside intervention — by the U.N. and the United States. We have said we stand ready to help, but we can only do so if both parties to the dispute want us to, and thus far the Indians have insisted that this is a bilateral dispute.

In Sri Lanka, the new government has come up with a set of proposals for devolution of power which addresses many of the concerns of the Tamil minority. We think that it is a good basis for discussion and negotiation, and we have said so publicly.

Q: Halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a high priority of the Clinton administration. What is it doing about nuclear proliferation in South Asia?

RAPHEL: This is, as I said, one of our major issues, and it's a difficult one. We believe that both India and Pakistan are capable of producing a modest number of nuclear weapons in a fairly short period of time. That has been the case for awhile. We have discussions with both sides, trying to find ways to help these governments understand that their future security does not lie along this path. There have been various suggestions over the years about approaching this

problem on a regional basis, but none of these has materialized yet. We continue to explore this approach.

We are encouraging both India and Pakistan to participate in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Neither has signed the NPT. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, of course, is coming up, and we are working very closely with both governments to urge them to be constructive in Geneva and to sign on to that treaty when the text is finally formed. We are also concerned about the potential for ballistic missiles in South Asia. Thus far neither India nor Pakistan has deployed ballistic missiles, and we have urged restraint on both sides.

Q: What is the U.S. doing to forestall the possibility of an arms race between India and Pakistan?

RAPHEL: We have said to both countries that we recognize that they are entitled to a strong defense. At the same time, they also have vast needs in terms of economic and social development, and they have both embarked on economic reform programs. They are interested in attracting trade and investment. These goals wouldn't be well served by an arms race. I think they understand where their interests lie.

Q: According to the annual State Department report on human rights around the world, there are a number of human rights violations occurring in the South Asian region. What are the most typical ones?

RAPHEL: First, there is the problem of discrimination against minority groups and different ethnic groups, religious groups, and women. The second type involves police misuse of their authority and treatment of people in police custody; in most South Asian countries you have a problem with death in custody and torture. And then in various parts of South Asia there are militant groups or insurgencies underway. The level of brutality in these insurgencies can be quite alarming. These kinds of issues are common throughout the region.

It's fair to say that today there is a much greater awareness of human rights standards than there was ten years ago. I think the international community can take a lot of credit for that, and the United States can take some in terms of the effort we put into our human rights report.

I think overall there's been a growing commitment to human rights. In India, the national Human Rights Commission has done very good work and gained authority and respect. In Sri Lanka, a list of 32 recommendations from Amnesty International has been implemented.

Q: What is being done to support anti-drug efforts in the region?

RAPHEL: In Pakistan, Afghanistan and India we have active counter-narcotics programs. We've been limited in what we can do in Afghanistan because of the security situation and the fact that there's no real central government there. We have contributed through the United Nations to modest crop substitution projects and incentives. But in a country like Afghanistan where the economy has been essentially destroyed, drugs are a huge business. It is very easy to grow poppies, so it is a big problem.

Q: What is the U.S. doing to encourage and foster a free market economic system in South Asia? What advantages would such a system offer the countries of the region?

RAPHEL: Most of the countries of South Asia — India to the greatest extent, but also Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka — have all been moving toward a freer market system over the last five years.

Reforms have been implemented, and we have been supporting them, helping various programs through the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Service. In Sri Lanka, for example, we have been helping establish and modernize the stock exchange through various training programs. We are doing various things to help sharpen and focus economic institutions in these countries.

We have sent several trade missions to South Asia. The late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown had tremendous success last year in India in leading a mission of U.S. businessmen that really helped increase the awareness of American business people about trade with India. We have devoted a lot of time to economic development, and we will continue to do more export and investment promotion.

Q: How is Secretary Christopher's initiative to integrate environmental issues into U.S. diplomacy being implemented in the region? What is being done to halt environmental degradation?

RAPHEL: The environment is a very important issue in South Asia because of the many problems, such as deforestation, that occur when a population of close to 1,500 million people are crammed into urban centers and settling along rivers and occupying increasing amounts of arable land. There is a problem with pollution, impure water and fumes in the air which affect the ozone layer. In addition, there is a rapid increase in the demand for power; power plants are going up all over the region, resulting in a real potential to affect the global climate.

We have initiated a common agenda for the environment with India and are doing an environmental outreach program here for South Asia, drawing on non-governmental organizations to determine what more we can do to be effective on issues of the environment.

Q: We have focused on problems. What about successes?

RAPHEL: I would certainly say that on the economic side things have gone very well in South Asia. The South Asians have started on the road to market economies, creating enormous opportunities for U.S. investment and trade.

I also think that although the non-proliferation issue is one that we have focused on because of India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs, it's also important to remember that India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but hasn't done so since. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear device. Neither country has big, flashy, widely publicized nuclear arsenals; there's restraint there. We would like to have them as signatories to the NPT and give up the nuclear option altogether, but, under the circumstances, I think there's been a fair amount of restraint. Our efforts have borne some fruit in that regard.

If you look over the years at what we have accomplished on economic assistance, there are some real successes. In the case of Bangladesh, in the last few years they've privatized the fertilizer industry. This is something we worked very hard with them on. It is a very important step in getting a more efficient agriculture sector.

In Nepal, the years of work on family planning are finally turning a corner in terms of the statistics and birthrates.

So, there are lots of successes, but much more work to do for the governments and us in areas of policy concern. It is a fascinating part of the world which is still relatively unknown, and very rich in many ways, both culturally and in economic potential. ●

THE COMPLICATED WORLD THAT HAS REPLACED THE COLD WAR

By Jim Anderson

The post-Soviet era “has turned out to be less predictable, less manageable and in some ways more dangerous” than the Cold War it replaced, and the United States, the only remaining superpower, “has to deal with the not always welcome task of leading the way through this unexplored landscape,” writes the author. Without its leadership, “a vital, central element is lacking” which virtually ensures failure in meeting major problems. Anderson is a correspondent for dpa, the German Press Agency, and formerly for UPI. He has covered U.S. foreign policy for more than 25 years.

On August 3, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stood shoulder-to-shoulder at Moscow’s main airport and read a joint statement condemning the previous day’s Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and joining in an economic embargo against the aggressor. Since Iraq was a Soviet client state, it was an electric, defining moment, which Baker believes marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of Something Else.

Something Else has turned out to be less than universal peace on earth. The Soviet Union has disappeared, but the post-Soviet era for the United States has turned out to be less predictable, less manageable and in some ways more dangerous. The world has become more complicated than we thought, more subtly perilous than we feared, but also more promising and challenging than in the frigid days of the Cold War.

As the most vivid illustration of the unpredictability of that watershed moment in Moscow, Shevardnadze resigned his post one year later warning of the “coming dictatorship” in the Soviet Union. As the elected president of the independent Georgian Republic, involved in a bloody civil war and struggle against a messianic rebel-gangster, Shevardnadze was nearly assassinated last year in the power struggle. The Soviet Union, itself, imploded into a shattered collection of republics, tribes and feuding nationalities, some of them model democracies, others little more than feudal fiefdoms.

The United Nations, a more potent world force since and because of the end of the rivalry between the two

superpowers in the Security Council, counts some 40-plus conflicts still raging or smoldering around the world — many of them in the Central Asian republics on the former Soviet Union’s southern border.

Despite the end of apartheid in South Africa — itself an indirect result of the end of the Cold War — Africa has half a dozen major conflicts in any given week. Some of them, such as Rwanda and Liberia, were killing grounds that rivaled the horrors committed in Cambodia. There was the relatively new and apparently growing number of “failed states,” countries where the central institutions crumbled under the weight of corruption, disease, famine, well-armed rebels and tribal warfare. It was a problem where the former answers — more foreign aid or peacekeeping troops — did not suffice.

In the words of another former American secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, we may look back with nostalgia to the simpler days of the Cold War. The United States, as the sole remaining military and economic superpower, has to deal with the not always welcome task of leading the way through this unexplored landscape.

The end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry coincided with the extraordinary coalition of countries that fought in the Persian Gulf war. This created a unique window of opportunity to deal with one of the world’s most intractable problems, the Arab-Israeli struggle in the Middle East. The former adversaries and now partners, Russia and the United States, became co-chairmen of the Madrid conference of more than 30 nations that was the

setting for the beginning of direct talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

After years of sparring and feinting between the two sides, secret talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization created one of the most striking images of the decade: PLO chairman Yassir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn, with a proudly beaming President Bill Clinton looking on. The process continued with a series of agreements leading to a partial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank followed by a peace treaty — again brokered by the United States — between Israel and Jordan. There the process stalled, with the painfully slow Syrian-Israeli talks disrupted by another characteristic of the new world order, international terrorism.

The challenge of terrorism, along with a burgeoning international trade in narcotics — “drugs and thugs” — created a growing awareness that the era of traditional foreign policy is over. A nation — particularly one with the responsibilities that the United States took on — could no longer deal with just the political, military and economic side of international relations. The U.S. government was confronted with a whole new list of non-traditional “global issues” that profoundly affect the national security of the United States and its allies: cross-border environmental and oceanic pollution, international crime and money laundering, human rights abuses, the proliferation of both conventional and mass-destruction weapons, and trade. These became an integral part of the new diplomacy that is being fashioned in the first decade after the end of the Cold War.

Trade became the driving issue in U.S. relations with the two major nations in Asia, Japan and China. One of the operating principles of the new American foreign policy was that the United States needed economic prosperity — specifically, the ability to export American products and services — to carry out its global responsibilities and would insist on its right to fair and equal trade treatment from both countries.

Another strategic principle was to always avoid a situation where U.S. relations with both China and Japan would be strained at the same time. It was sometimes a difficult balancing act, given the interminable succession crisis in Beijing and the

upheavals in Japan’s new style of party politics, but it has seemed to work. Another basic tenet of U.S. policy was that the United States would remain an Asian-Pacific military power, a decision that seemed to defuse periods of occasional tension such as the recent test of wills between Taiwan and China.

If there was a single place where all the agonies, frustrations and possibilities of the post-Cold War were encapsulated for U.S. foreign policy, it was in the former Yugoslavia. The fragmentation of the once Communist state created a bewildering tangle of nationalism, religious and ethnic separatism, and unending historic enmities. After first standing aside to give the European Union countries and the United Nations a chance to end what appeared to be a new kind of civil war, the U.S. government realized belatedly that this was a new variation of the traditional Balkan powder keg, with all the potential for disaster manifest in previous Balkan conflicts, which had once led even to world war.

As it became clear that the festering war could spread southward, possibly involving Greece, Turkey, Albania, and indirectly Iran and other Islamic states, the United States asserted its leading diplomatic role. The U.S. government used a combination of promises of help, threats and ingenious legal formulations to induce the three major warring parties to come to a unique peace conference in Dayton, Ohio. After several near walkouts and long nights of table-pounding confrontations at a sequestered U.S. Air Force base, an agreement was signed, leading to an uneasy end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia.

The lesson learned by the administration was that U.S. involvement in major international problems is not easy and success is never assured. The United States has decided to resist, out of a sense of what is politically and militarily possible, taking on the role of the world’s policeman. But the administration has also come to understand that without the direct leadership of the United States, a vital, central element is lacking which virtually ensures the failure of any attempt to peacefully resolve any major potential conflict in the complex post-Cold War world.

That conclusion is not universally accepted in another post-Cold War battleground, Capitol Hill. Freshmen

Republican members of Congress combined in an odd alliance with hard-line conservatives who had ascended to influential positions of power and liberals who want diminishing federal funds used for domestic social programs. Together they question the need for such a preeminent and costly American global role now that the threat of nuclear annihilation has receded. That may be the most subtle and difficult challenge of all: proving that American leadership is necessary and that it entails large costs, both in money and potential loss of American lives.

In a United States where voters seem to be edgy and concerned with their own problems, such as corporate “downsizing,” there is a temptation to vote for candidates who promise to downsize the American role abroad. This means giving a cold shoulder to those who try to make the difficult argument that the end of the Cold War simply marked the beginning of a new and different kind of struggle to preserve the kind of world most Americans want to live in and that this struggle requires American leadership. ©

(The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government.)

MANY CONSTITUENCIES INFLUENCE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

By I.M. Destler

Although many groups seek to influence foreign policy decisions, the President usually gets his way on matters he cares most about, says the author. But since the end of the Cold War, “foreign policy-making has become less distinctive, less different from matters domestic,” he says, which means the President “must work more closely than ever with key groups.”

The author is professor at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, director of its Center for International and Security Studies, and co-director of the center's Project on Foreign Policy and the Public.

His publications include “American Trade Politics,” which won the Gladys M. Kammerer Award of the American Political Science Association for the best book on U.S. national policy.

“Foreign relations begin at home.”

America's leading political scientist Richard Neustadt made this observation more than a quarter century ago, discussing events under Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-61) and John F. Kennedy (1961-63). Even during the long Cold War with the Soviet Union, even before the virulent protests over U.S. involvement in Vietnam, American leaders knew that foreign policy

required domestic support. For example, U.S. dealings with the People's Republic of China were minimal throughout the 1950s and 1960s because executive and congressional leaders feared a fierce political backlash to the United States “recognizing Red China.” And the United States Congress, exercising its “power of the purse,” regularly cut back presidential proposals for economic and military assistance to foreign nations.

To understand why power over foreign policy is divided, the place to begin is our governing charter, the U.S. Constitution. Authorities sometimes state that it gives the President the predominant power over international issues. But it doesn't. He can draw from its direct language just a handful of powers of direct relevance: negotiating treaties, appointing and receiving ambassadors, commanding the armed forces. Congress has a longer specific list: ratifying treaties, confirming ambassadors, declaring war, maintaining armed forces, regulating foreign commerce. And if one moves to more general authorities, the legislative branch again appears to have the upper hand: the chief executive's right to sign or veto bills pales before its authority to control their content, particularly those bills which provide (or withhold) money. Had the Congress, skeptical about sending U.S. forces to Bosnia, employed all its powers in opposition, President Bill Clinton would not have been able to do so.

Democratic Senator J.W. Fulbright of Arkansas, the most prominent legislative leader on foreign policy in the early Cold War years, called it conducting foreign policy "in the 20th century under an 18th century Constitution." He saw U.S. international relations as hostage to "parochial minded" legislators driven by narrow interests and local constituencies. Yet this very fact — that senators and representatives are driven by diverse concerns — gives the President the opportunity to lead on most international issues, most of the time. With congressional energies directed mainly elsewhere, he and his key officials — the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs — can use their control over the day-to-day conduct of policy to maintain the initiative. The President is particularly strong if he is pursuing causes for which there is broad public support, for Americans expect the President to be active in representing Americans' international concerns.

This was more often than not the case on major strategic issues in the half-century from the U.S. entry into World War II in 1941 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, however, the President cannot count on broad support so readily. The American public continues to favor U.S. engagement in the world; despite the fears of many foreign policy specialists, Americans have not turned isolationist. But the public gives lower

priority to foreign concerns than it used to; there is less attention to matters international, and more to problems within the United States. So it is less likely that the President himself will give priority to expanding or even maintaining international programs like foreign assistance. And it is more likely that Congress will act to cut funds for these programs. With both branches of government under pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit, all programs of "discretionary spending" — funded by year-to-year congressional appropriations — are particularly vulnerable to reductions.

With no single, central conflict to shape U.S. foreign policy, there is also a higher probability that the President and/or Congress will give priority to issues of particular concern to ethnic or special-interest groups. Clinton has, for example, concentrated personally on bringing democracy and law to Haiti (an emphasis pressed by the Congressional Black Caucus) and bringing peace to Northern Ireland (ferently desired by Irish-Americans), as well as continuing his predecessors' priority to the Middle East. And the President has been constrained in his approach to Cuba by the vocal (and overwhelmingly anti-Castro) Cuban-American community concentrated in the important electoral state of Florida.

In none of these cases is attention given solely for reasons of ethnic politics; for his actions to redound to his benefit over the longer term, the President must be pursuing goals which have support beyond narrow constituencies. Otherwise, he is vulnerable to the charge of "pandering" to special interests. But these groups can have disproportionate influence over the details of policy; because they care, their representatives take the time to "lobby" the responsible government officials. If they find the executive branch insufficiently responsive, they can work to get Congress to pass laws on their behalf. Indeed, the most effective lobbying groups, like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), work continuously with both branches.

Economic interests are another important influence, particularly on international trade and financial policies. When our government seeks to expand trade through negotiated reductions in import barriers, it needs the support of U.S. manufacturers whose sales will benefit from better access to foreign markets, in order to counter

the predictable opposition of companies who compete with imports in the domestic market. If an industry seeking trade protection is large enough, and effective in building influence with Congress and the executive, it may win exceptions to the general U.S. policy of open trade. The textile-apparel industry is a case in point. Its persistent lobbying got members of Congress to threaten special legislation, and got successive Presidents to authorize negotiation of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement restricting textile and apparel imports. In the Uruguay Round negotiation concluded in 1993, the world's trading nations agreed to end this arrangement, but the industry was still powerful enough to win a slow, ten-year phase-out period.

Economic interests do not always win. Organized labor has had limited impact on U.S. trade policy, despite its campaigns against rising imports and movement of U.S.-owned factories to foreign nations. The major labor unions were important supporters of Clinton's election, but he overrode their passionate opposition in winning congressional approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993. He also went against the wishes of a number of important environmental organizations whose support he had received before and would want again in the future.

But while the President did not accede to these groups' strongest wishes, he did not ignore them either. Before presenting NAFTA (negotiated and signed by his predecessor, George Bush) to Congress for approval, Clinton negotiated "side agreements" with Mexico and Canada on labor and environmental issues. In seeking congressional authorization to negotiate future agreements reducing trade barriers, his administration asked specifically in 1994 that this include trade-related environmental issues and matters of international labor

standards. When organized business and influential members of Congress resisted these labor and environmental provisions, the President accepted stalemate in U.S. trade policy rather than agreeing to proceed without them. This meant a delay in specific negotiations for free trade with other Western Hemisphere nations like Chile, as pledged in December 1994 at the Western Hemisphere summit in Miami. It has also limited U.S. steps to implement the November 1994 agreement by the nations of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) to achieve free trade among themselves by the year 2010.

As these examples suggest, foreign policy-making is, when all is said and done, a branch of democratic politics. The President, Congress, the public, and special-interest groups all seek to influence decisions and actions in both the executive and legislative arenas. The President's influence remains greater on average, relative to Congress and special groups, than it is on most domestic matters; it is rare that a President suffers the sort of humiliating failure here that Clinton experienced in 1994 with his health care proposals. When the chief executive "goes to the mat" on a foreign policy issue, he will usually win. Clinton's initial proposals on aid to Russia were fully funded by Congress, notwithstanding a lot of criticism. But since the end of the Cold War, foreign policy-making has become less distinctive, less different from matters domestic. This means that Congress and special interests are likely to have greater impact than in 1941-1991. It means that the President must work more closely than ever with key groups if he is to carry out effective international policies. ●

(The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government.)

“WE HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE OUR WAY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD”

*By Morton I. Abramowitz
President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

The author outlines five features of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy that he says “show that we are moving forward in some sensible directions.” Abramowitz is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and a former ambassador to Turkey and Thailand.

*This article is excerpted from the 1996 annual George F. Kennan lecture,
which he delivered at the Department of State.*

We have begun to make our way in the post-Cold War world, although domestic politics are making it difficult to keep our footing.

First, we understand a major political fact — though we haven’t got unlimited power or all the answers, in this new era, the United States is still the pre-eminent power, the cutting-edge of alliances, the only mobilizer of nations, and the principal stabilizing force in the world. Indeed, for years to come, neither the European Union, nor China or Japan, nor the United Nations system, can substitute for American power and U.S.-brokered alliances.

We also have learned some important things from experience. After the First World War, we threw away our alliances. After the Second World War, we demobilized but in the face of a unifying threat quickly rearmed and developed security pacts in peacetime. Now, in the post-Cold War era, in an unprecedented preeminent power position, we have maintained our alliances and significant military and intelligence capacities in the absence both of war and of compelling threat. The intellectual markets of Washington and Tokyo periodically pronounce the U.S.-Japan alliance dead, but the alliance continues because both countries want it and feel they need it. The recent tension in the Taiwan Straits has given it another nine lives. I do not minimize the difficulty of maintaining alliance cohesion in today’s circumstances. NATO’s incoherence for four years over Yugoslavia shows the difficulties we can expect in keeping alliances viable and credible in an age of unclear threat.

Second, despite our occasional flirtations with trade barriers and unilateralism, as well as political weakness among the G-7 leaders, we have helped significantly to integrate the world economic system through NAFTA, the WTO, and APEC. The impact of this effort goes beyond the economic benefits — and social costs — to us and the world. Indeed, these new mechanisms will probably be more significant than traditional national security instruments to preventing war and hostility — but only in the long term. In the nearer term, the profound impact of globalization is creating, for both developed and developing countries, not just great rewards, but also obvious strains, such as unemployment and vast income disparities, which can generate or intensify protectionist passions and internal and external instabilities. Domestic political considerations limit our ability to further expand economic integration — like bringing Chile into NAFTA; they limit our ability today even to talk much about NAFTA.

Third, U.S. leadership has, after many years, succeeded in institutionalizing in most of the world community the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is an impressive achievement, even if there are loopholes in the various treaties and conventions and we overlook a few friendly violators. We have also gone a long way in delegitimizing in the international community other means of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons. It is hard to establish and maintain the means for controlling the profusion of small-scale, but highly destructive, threats in the midst of an information explosion and erupting regional conflicts.

The effort requires constancy, sophisticated monitoring, the improvement and expansion of intelligence operations, and international agreements that may promise more than they achieve. But the world is generally committed to counter-proliferation; without the United States in front, however, it will founder.

Fourth, we have, to an impressive degree, advanced the process of making humanitarianism, and in many cases the accompanying need for the difficult and derided task of nation-building, accepted elements not just of our own foreign policy, but of those of other governments and inter-governmental institutions. This trend has been helped by the vast growth of non-governmental organizations. It has saved or improved the lives of vast numbers of people and helped contain regional conflicts. It also requires ever increasing amounts of public monies. The controversy tends to be over costly and dramatic humanitarian interventions by the military, but they are, in fact, a relatively small portion of worldwide crisis management efforts.

Fifth and lastly, successive Democratic and Republican administrations have made democracy and human rights a basic part of our foreign policy. We have

contributed to successes in Latin America, in Portugal, Spain and South Africa, in a few European countries where the Soviet empire held sway, and in Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. We have worked best in countries whose people wanted democracy but needed help, when we have made a full-fledged, wide-reaching effort and where other Western democracies have worked with us. Our policies have developed major constituencies in many countries, not just our own, who can influence democratic governments, usually by shaming them.

These five broad features of our post-Cold War policy — maintaining strong alliances, fostering economic integration, controlling weapons proliferation, humanitarianism, and the promotion of democratic values — do not add up to a paradigm. They also do not tell us how to deal with some sticky problems — but they show that we are moving forward in some sensible directions. ●

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ACTION ON CAPITOL HILL

(as of May 10)

ANTI-TERRORISM

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 2703, S. 735, Conference Report: H. Report 104-518

DESCRIPTION: Gives the government new tools to fight terrorism, improves current law to facilitate removal of suspected foreign terrorists from U.S., keeps foreign terrorists from raising money in the U.S., makes membership in a terrorist organization the basis for exclusion from the U.S., and allows U.S. citizens harmed by a terrorist act to bring suit against a sponsoring terrorist nation in federal court.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved conference report April 18 by a vote of 293 to 133.

SENATE ACTION: Approved conference report April 17 by a vote of 91 to 8.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Signed into law (P.L. 104-132) by President Clinton April 24.

FUNDING FOR STATE DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 1561, S. 908, Conference Report: H. Report 104-478

DESCRIPTION: Would have authorized activities of the State Department, U.S. Information Agency (USIA), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for fiscal years 1996 and 1997.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Vetoed April 12 by President Clinton who said the conference report authorized too little funding; he also objected to a variety of its mandates including a directive that he abolish one of three foreign affairs agencies — USIA, USAID or ACDA. House failed April 30 to override veto.

There will be no authorization this fiscal year for the State Department and related foreign affairs agencies. Language waiving the requirement for an authorization is in the omnibus appropriations conference report (H. Report

104-537) approved by Congress April 25 and signed into law (P.L. 104-134) by Clinton the next day. The measure provides funding for the rest of the fiscal year for the State Department and related agencies and makes supplemental appropriations for certain national security priorities, including \$860 million for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 2202, S. 1664

DESCRIPTION: Would reduce illegal border crossings by increased enforcement and cut off most public benefits to unlawful immigrants.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved its version March 21 by a vote of 333 to 87.

SENATE ACTION: Approved its version May 2 by a vote of 97 to 3.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Both versions now go to a conference committee of House and Senate members. A number of controversial provisions in both bills must be worked out in conference.

LEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 2202, S. 1665

DESCRIPTION: Would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to slightly reduce the numbers admitted each year, change the categories of people admitted, and revise the order of priority for admittance. Would reduce the number of visas available under the “diversity” immigrant visa program. Would also reform practices regarding admission and employment of H-1B nonimmigrants employed in certain specialty occupations.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved its version March 21 by a vote of 333 to 87, but removed almost all of the provisions dealing with legal immigration.

SENATE ACTION: Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 1665 March 28.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: No new bill dealing with legal immigration has been introduced in House. S. 1665 has not been scheduled for Senate floor action, and legal immigration reform is not expected to be completed in this Congress.

ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 3144, S. 1635

DESCRIPTION: Would mandate deployment by 2003 of an anti-missile defense system that could defend all 50 states.

HOUSE ACTION: National Security Committee May 1 approved H.R. 3144 which also has been referred to House International Relations Committee.

SENATE ACTION: Senate Armed Services Committee approved S. 1635 on April 23. It now goes to the full Senate.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Administration opposes the legislation because it believes deployment of such a system is not justified by any near-term threat.

IRAN SANCTIONS

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 3107, S. 1228

DESCRIPTION: Both bills would impose sanctions on persons exporting certain goods or technology that would enhance Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources.

HOUSE ACTION: International Relations Committee April 17 approved H.R. 3107, which includes more sanctions and fewer options for the president. Referred to Ways and Means Committee.

SENATE ACTION: Senate approved its version December 20, 1995.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: House expected to approve legislation with some modifications, and Congress expected to pass some version of legislation. Administration supports legislation to tighten sanctions against Iran and is continuing to work with Congress over details of this legislation.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

DESCRIPTION: CWC would prohibit the use, stockpiling, manufacturing and trading of chemicals which are common to chemical weapons.

HOUSE ACTION: Not required on ratification of treaties.

SENATE ACTION: Foreign Relations Committee approved resolution by a bipartisan vote of 13 to 5 April 25.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Administration supports resolution and hopes that the Senate will take this up at its first opportunity. ●

ELSEWHERE ON THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE

WORKING TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Negotiators meeting at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva are racing against the clock to complete by the end of June the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) — an international accord which would ban all nuclear weapons test explosions for all time.

Achieving a test ban would be a major step toward stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

Negotiators believe there is now a unique “window of opportunity” to complete the treaty — but success is not certain. The Conference on Disarmament works on the basis of consensus, which means that all CD members must agree on the final treaty text, or at least agree to

forward the text to the U.N. General Assembly for its consideration. At the close of the first part of the CD's 1996 session in March, several countries appeared to be adhering to positions unacceptable to other delegations.

One proposal which is unacceptable to the United States and other nations insists on linking the CTBT to a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament. Another proposal calls for so-called "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions" (PNEs) to be allowed under the treaty; the U.S. and other delegations are in agreement that the treaty should ban all nuclear explosions. Another controversy to be resolved concerns which and how many countries will have to ratify the treaty before it enters into force.

The treaty must be completed during the current CD session (May 13-June 28) if it is to be opened for signature as planned on the eve of the 51st United Nations General Assembly.

ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Spurred by the growing interest in the ad hoc War Crimes Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, representatives of some 120 countries met in Geneva in April and agreed that an international consensus has emerged on the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court.

By the end of their three-week session, the representatives had reviewed a draft statute and collected position papers for governments to inspect before they meet again in August to complete a draft plan to be submitted to the 51st U.N. General Assembly this fall. If the assembly approves the draft, an international conference would be convened, perhaps as early as next year, to bring the new court into existence.

Despite some pressure to include crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking, there seems to be general agreement that the court should be limited to the "core crimes" of international concern — genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Other issues being

debated are: whether the court's jurisdiction would cover civil wars, whether the U.N. Security Council would be the main avenue for bringing cases to the court or the chief prosecutor would have the authority to independently seek out cases, and whether a statute of limitations should be allowed.

U.S. delegate Jamison Borek said President Clinton "has supported in principle the creation of a court with an appropriate role for the Security Council."

EXAMINING HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AROUND THE WORLD

The 52nd session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which met from March 18 to April 26 in Geneva, reviewed human rights observance worldwide and adopted resolutions on what it noted in Cuba, Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, Burma, Iran and Nigeria, among others. It supported a strongly critical resolution on the human rights situation in Iraq.

In a setback, however, the Chinese delegation succeeded in blocking consideration of a resolution that would have expressed concern about the human rights situation in China. John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, accused China of attempting to create a "double standard" within the commission by wielding its diplomatic and economic weight to block scrutiny of its human rights record.

The 1996 commission meeting revealed a growing trend toward integration of the human rights of women into reporting on human rights. More than 40 resolutions specifically addressed the rights of women, emphasizing issues such as rape and sexual assault, and discrimination. Much attention focused on the second report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, which spotlighted the situation of women in times of armed conflict and led to a major debate on the issue of reparations to former "comfort women" forced into prostitution by the Japanese military during World War II. ●

SPOTLIGHT ON U.S. SPEAKERS — DON OBERDORFER

Don Oberdorfer, journalist-in-residence at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, is well-qualified for his USIA-sponsored, mid-June speaking engagements in Beijing, Chengdu, Nanjing and Shanghai in China. His 38-year career as a working journalist included not only 17 years as diplomatic correspondent of the Washington Post but also a three-year assignment covering Northeast Asia and extensive travels in East Asia.

He was a member of the Policy Panel of the Council on Foreign Relations Asia Project, which last month published its recommendations on an East Asia policy for the next U.S. administration, regardless of which party directs it. Here is a brief description by Oberdorfer of some of the recommendations concerning China:

The final report began, “A great transformation is underway in East Asia with immense consequences for the United States. Asia’s emergence as a vibrant center of the world economy is the most important economic shift in the last 50 years. American foreign policy has been slow to come to grips with the challenges posed by Asia’s economic transformation and the end of the Cold War.”

From this central starting point, we laid down our observations about the changes in the region and our recommendations for U.S. policy to cope with them.

The single most important challenge facing the United States in the region, we declared, is how to respond to China’s rise (really its return) to great power status. We considered a great variety of policies and heard many opinions on how to deal with this vast, populous and increasingly important nation. Our considered view, which I heartily endorsed, is that the Bush-Clinton policy of engagement of China is essentially correct, but that it needs to be pursued much more vigorously and at a higher level.

What attracted the most attention was our recommendation that the U.S. president should seek a full-scale summit meeting every year with the leader of China, regardless of the state of political relations. We also recommended regular cabinet-level meetings and exchanges between U.S. and Chinese legislators, as well as intensified unofficial exchanges involving business, scholarly and humanitarian groups.

Thinking of how to deal with China called to mind some of the most vivid experiences of my journalistic career, the summit meetings and other high-level working sessions I covered between the leaders of the United States and the former Soviet Union.

When summits were held, the Washington-Moscow relationship tended to make progress, sometimes rapid progress. Equally important, the regular and intensive business meeting between summits of the U.S. Secretaries of State with Soviet Foreign Ministers — and of those senior diplomatic officials with the General Secretary or President of the other country — helped tremendously to contain the many controversies that divided the two countries.

As an author of a book on U.S.-Soviet negotiations during the Cold War, I am more than ever impressed with the crucial role that personal interaction played in dealing with difficult international issues. Important issues between major countries cannot be solved simply by dialogue between policymakers who come to know and have confidence in one another; however, I am convinced that without such dialogue, knowledge and confidence it is difficult or impossible to work out differences between major nations in the contemporary era. In the end people, as well as politics and national interest, are at the heart of diplomacy. ©

(The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government.)

AMERICA'S ROLE: KEY INTERNET SITES

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http://www.brook.edu/fp/fp_hp.htm

Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Foreign Policy Analysis Section of the International
Studies Association
<http://csf.colorado.edu/isafp/>

Harvard, Kennedy School Online Political Information
Network
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/~library/internat.htm>

Henry L. Stimson Center — The Foreign Policy Project
<http://www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/index.htm>

Heritage Foundation — Latest Foreign Policy Papers
<http://www.townhall.com/heritage/whatsnew/welcome.html>

IANWEB Resources — Foreign Policy
<http://www.pitt.edu/~ian/ianres.html>

IANWEB Resources — Periodicals and Working Papers
<http://www.pitt.edu/~ian/resource/period.htm>

Rand Research Center — U.S. Foreign Relations
<http://www.rand.org/areas/USFR.Toc.html>

U.S. House of Representatives
<http://www.house.gov/>

Democratic National Committee — Issues of Concern
<http://www.democrats.org/>

Republican Policy Committee — Policy Papers
<http://www.senate.gov/~rpc/gopindex.htm#alphforeign>

U.S. State Department — U.S. Foreign Policy Around the
World
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/www/regions/internat.html>

Strategic Studies Institute
<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>

White House
<http://www2.whitehouse.gov/WH/Welcome.html> ◎

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Clinton, William J. "Leadership Role Vital to U.S. Security, Prosperity." WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, *October 9, 1995*, pp: 1775-1783.

<http://library.whitehouse.gov/Retrieve-plain.cgi?dbtype=text&id=5469&query=speech+and+freedom+house>
In an address that may serve as a foundation for his re-election campaign, President Clinton told an audience at Freedom House that the U.S. must maintain a position of leadership in world affairs or democracy and market economics will not prevail.

Dole, Robert. "Shaping America's Global Future." FOREIGN POLICY, *Spring 1995*, pp: 29-43.

http://www.eneews.com/data/magazines/alphabetic/all/foreign_policy/Archive/032195.1

The American victory in the Cold War allows the U.S. to be more selective in its involvement around the world, Dole says, but it does not give license for the U.S. to withdraw from the world.

Hyland, William, and Ullman, Richard. "The Clinton Report Card." FOREIGN POLICY, *Winter 1995-96*, pp: 68-79.

The authors grade President Clinton's foreign policy record over the past three years and give him overall ratings of C and B.

Kohout, John; Lambakis, Steven; and Payne, Keith. "Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States." COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, *October/December 1995*, pp: 361-420.

The recent evolution in U.S. grand strategy from "containment" to "engagement and enlargement" is traced.

McDougall, Walter. "U.S. Foreign Policy." ORBIS, *Spring 1995*, pp: 143-148.

McDougall discusses issues concerning the U.S. and its economic, foreign and military policies after the Cold War.

Muravchik, Joshua. THE IMPERATIVE OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1996*, p: 273.

Muravchik makes one of the first attempts to articulate an active, interventionist U.S. foreign policy for the post-Cold War era. This book forms the basis for an April 19, 1996 American Enterprise Institute conference on "America and the World: 1996 and Beyond."

Steel, Ronald. TEMPTATIONS OF A SUPERPOWER. *Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1995*, p: 144.

Steel, political scientist at the University of Southern California, examines what he calls the ambiguous American victory in the Cold War and discusses complications in finding a new role after the fall of its more easily defined enemies.

Steinberg, James. "Policy and Principles: The Clinton Administration's Approach." DISPATCH, *February 5, 1996*, pp: 26-29.

<gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0Q%3A96/01/24%20Speech-%20James%3A2%3A3413%3A19204>

James B. Steinberg, Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, discusses U.S. foreign policy, including benefits that have resulted under the Clinton administration.

Talbott, Strobe. "American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World." DISPATCH, *May 1, 1995*, pp: 372-376.

<gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0Q%3ADispatch%20v.620n.18-5/01/95%3A2%3A1547%3A-1411391728%3A8447>

Remarks by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott before the Foreign Policy Association regarding America's role in post-Cold War world affairs.

Talbott, Strobe. "When Peace Process Resumes, U.S. Will Once Again Be in Lead." *Remarks at Town Meeting in St. Louis, March 6, 1996*.

<gopher://198.80.36.82:70/0R6042785-6061225-range/archives/1996/pdq.96>

In this address, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott discusses the Middle East peace process as well as the broader topic of U.S. foreign policy. ©

ARTICLE ALERT: OTHER POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Cimbala, Stephen J. PROLIFERATION AND PEACE: AN AGNOSTIC VIEW *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22, no. 2, Winter 1995/96, pp. 211-233

Political scientist Cimbala identifies three perspectives on the relationship between nuclear weapons and international stability: the realist, the perspective of "nuclear irrelevancy," and the agnostic; he says the last is most persuasive because it recognizes that nuclear warfare is neither impossible nor certain but, rather, dependent on "homo psychologicus" operating in the context of perceived threats and options.

Davis, Zachary S. THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE-ZONES: BUILDING A NEW NUCLEAR BARGAIN *Arms Control Today*, vol. 26, no. 1, February 1996, pp. 15-19

Davis discusses the reaction of the nuclear weapon states to the proliferation of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ) as well as the future of such zones. With one NWFZ already in force in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlateloco) and treaties for Africa (the Pelindaba Treaty) and Southeast Asia soon to be implemented, it appears that there will continue to be a spread of NWFZ. Recognizing this reality, a U.S. strategy that embraces NWFZ as a tool of disarmament could increase U.S. as well as global security.

Eisenhower, David. THE YEAR OF THE WEARY ELECTORATE *Orbis*, vol. 40, no. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 11-25

Eisenhower provides an historical perspective of U.S. foreign policy since World War I. He writes that the 1996 presidential campaign will likely produce minimal foreign policy statements from candidates. With the end of the Cold War, candidates have consistently been unwilling to adopt foreign policy positions. According to Eisenhower, voters have become more concerned with domestic issues, such as crime and economic problems.

Hadar, Leon T. AMERICA'S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST *Current History*, vol. 95, no. 597, January 1996, pp. 1-5

Five years after the end of the Persian Gulf War, Hadar says, the United States and its allies have gained freedom of access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf. Combined with a more secure Israel, this has resulted in a Pax Americana in the Middle East. The Middle East has thus become another "normal" U.S. foreign policy problem and not a central one.

Ikle, Fred Charles. THE SECOND COMING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 119-128

Five decades have passed since the world has seen the nefarious effects of nuclear warfare, and many assume that threats of nuclear warfare are non-existent. However, Ikle points out that the nuclear threat is still very real. Several rogue nations that espouse terrorism are potential threats if they achieve full nuclear capability, because a catastrophic nuclear accident could occur. He argues the United States must lead the way in preventing nuclear weapons from becoming acceptable.

Kull, Steven. WHAT THE PUBLIC KNOWS THAT WASHINGTON DOESN'T *Foreign Policy*, no. 101, Winter 1995/96, pp. 102-115

Kull writes that presidential candidates and the U.S. Congress are retreating from internationalism, not because of public opinion, but despite it. He asserts that the U.S. public does not agree with the principles of isolationism. Although Americans do not think the United States should remain the "world's policeman," they do support U.S. involvement in world affairs. ●

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